

Increasing Effectiveness in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Increasing Effectiveness in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), by MAJ Paul D.

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TRADOC is a relevant and essential organization in today's Army. No other organization performs the functions that TRADOC accomplishes. Unfortunately, TRADOC is not operating as effective as it could be. Its process lines, or lines of command and control, are not firmly established. Additionally, TRADOC has a staff structure that is unlike any other structure in the Department of Defense. These seemingly unassuming criticisms hinder effective horizontal and vertical integration within TRADOC and throughout the rest of the Army and Department of Defense.

As well as providing recommended solutions, this monograph carries it one-step further by explaining how to implement the recommendations as well. Having a solution without a viable plan to implement them may prove the recommendations as unfeasible. This is accomplished by exploring the history of TRADOC and the challenges in its development, then applying those lessons learned to the recommended solutions. The Parker Panel, Reorganization of 1972, and Operations Steadfast are summarized. Exploring the history of TRADOC also provides an explanation of why TRADOC has the mission and functions that it is charged with today.

In establishing depth of analysis, TRADOC's current mission and functions will be derived from essential federal documents and regulations. The theoretical underpinnings are explained by using Frederick Taylor's *Principles of Scientific Management* and TRADOC's current major subordinate command and staff structures are dissected in order to describe process lines. Analyzing these aspects provides an explanation of the complexity of TRADOC's mission and functions along with the major subordinate command and staff structures to accomplish those functions and the ineffectiveness that has resulted.

To overcome the current ineffectiveness, it is recommended that TRADOC establishes clear lines of command and control and changes the current staff structure to the structure of a G-staff. Establishing clear lines of command and control fulfills the requirements set forth by Taylor's theory and adheres to the Army's doctrine of unity of command. Establishing a G-staff standardizes TRADOC to the rest of the Army and Department of Defense by making the staff functions recognizable to those outside of the organization. By tying in the lessons learned from the creation of TRADOC and the recommendations put forth, TRADOC is poised to become more effective.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“TRADOC is a goofy organization.”¹

GEN William S. Wallace, 2005

When General (GEN) Wallace took command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in the summer of 2005, the above quote was indicative of his overall view of the organization. He made this statement because TRADOC is unlike any other organization in the Army. It has multiple functions ranging from recruiting and combat developments to training. From a functional viewpoint, none of these functions have anything in common. This is unlike other military organizations that have a single focused mission. For example, “US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) trains, mobilizes, deploys, sustains, transforms, and reconstitutes conventional forces, providing relevant and ready land power to Combatant Commanders world wide in defense of the nation both at home and abroad.”²

GEN Wallace also made that statement because TRADOC does not look like any other major Army command. Instead of a G-staff³ that is a common fixture in other Army major commands, TRADOC has this unique coordinating staff structure led by a Deputy Chief of Staff. Additionally, where other commands have clear lines of command and control, TRADOC has a command and control structure categorized as direct authority, which is a little more vague and at times confusing. This diversity and current organizational structure causes problems with vertical

¹ GEN William S. Wallace, TRADOC Commander, quote from briefing, 19 November 2005, Fort Leavenworth, video teleconference, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

² FORSCOM Webpage, <http://www.forscom.army.mil/cgwelcome/Mission101804.htm>, accessed 30 January 2006.

³ General Staffs or G-staffs are responsible for acquiring information and analyzing its implications for and impact on the command. G-staffs are broken out by following functions, but can be

and horizontal integration as well as maintaining solid lines of command and control. These shortfalls could lead to problems of low morale and productivity in a time where every precious resource counts.

TRADOC's diversity is not unique to its history and its beginnings can be traced back to a lack of integration and unclear lines of command and control. TRADOC was founded upon Operation Steadfast's recommendation to split the Continental Army Command (CONARC) into TRADOC and FORSCOM. It was determined that CONARC was just too large of an organization to handle the functions of warfighting and everything that goes along with it to support it, such as combat developments and recruiting, just to name a few:

At the beginning of 1972, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was responsible both for maintaining forces in a state of readiness and for conducting individual training. In executing these missions, [CONARC] controlled a total of fifty-six subordinate elements. In addition, as more of the Active Army was based in the continental United States, the U.S. Continental Army Command would be responsible for a growing proportion of the Army's actual troop strength.⁴

The results from Operation Steadfast also recognized that the Army as a whole also had some issues of redundancy that had to be policed up. What transpired was the creation of FORSCOM with the primary responsibility of warfighting and TRADOC with the primary responsibility to support the warfighter.

Interestingly, history provides other insights that are invaluable in eliminating problems in vertical and horizontal integration as well as lines of command. If GEN Wallace chooses to mitigate some of the goofiness in TRADOC, exploring its conception and development gives great insight on the challenges that GEN Wallace may face. For example, during the Parker Panel, one of the special panels leading up to Operations Steadfast, senior leaders who did not

tailored by the commander: G1 – Personnel; G2 – Intelligence; G3 – Operations and Training; G4 – Logistics; G5 – Civil-Military Operations; G6 – Communications; and G8 – Resource Management.

agree with changing CONARC captured the process and halted any reorganization attempts. “The Parker Panel had outlined the problems and some solutions. Yet, the procedure had failed to bring about change.”⁵ The same lessons learned up to and through Operation Steadfast can be applied today. Many individuals are adverse to change and if the wrong team is in charge, change may never come about.

Today, TRADOC is a dynamic organization with a multitude of functions and subordinate commands spread out all over the United States. Theoretically, TRADOC can trace its purpose all the way back to the Constitution since it is mandated that Congress raise and support an Army. TRADOC is the portion of the Army that does the training and doctrine functions, leaving the warfighting to FORSCOM. There are also a multitude of other federal documents, regulations, etc., that spell out either specially, or imply TRADOC’s role in the Army. It is important to understand these documents in order to legitimize TRADOC and demonstrate its importance to the Army showing that no other organization duplicates TRADOC’s efforts. It is also important to examine these documents in order to understand the organizational structure that TRADOC has developed in order to accomplish all of its functions and the inherent problems with that structure. TRADOC could be a much better organization overall if it standardized its staff structure with the rest of the Army to facilitate integration and clarified its lines of command and control. There is an opinion in TRADOC that “coordination and direction lines are unclear”⁶ and such an opinion will prevent an organization from reaching its full potential.

⁴ U.S. Army Forces Command Historical Office. *Operation STEADFAST Historical Summary: A History of Reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command (1972-1973)*, by Jean R. Moenk, 31, (Fort McPherson, 1974).

⁵ James A. Bowden, “Operation Steadfast: the United States Army Reorganizes Itself” (student research and writing project, Marine Corps Command and Staff, 1985), 40.

⁶ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Transition Team Discussion” (brief presented to GEN Wallace 2005), slide 35.

TRADOC's structure is characterized as a traditional hierarchy. The premise behind such an organizational structure is that superiors direct subordinates and their respective organizations. This type of structure is prevalent throughout the military. A way to conceptualize this is by looking at manufacturing processes. For example, an automobile factory is "based on an extensive division of labor, in which highly complex processes like automobile assembly were broken down into a series of simple steps."⁷ The entire process is regulated through a centralized managerial hierarchy to insure integration of the different processes happened accordingly. This structure only works effectively if clear lines of command and control are established and maintained. Subordinates with multiple bosses become distracted by competing requirements. An unnamed Command Sergeant Major in TRADOC stated, "our own bureaucracy can be and has been our greatest weakness."⁸

It is important to keep in mind that despite TRADOC's shortcomings, it still provides a great service to the rest of the Army that cannot be duplicated. If GEN Wallace is serious about changing TRADOC to make it more like the rest of the Army and more effective, then his course of action should entail the following. First, looking at the origins of TRADOC and the lessons learned from its creation. Second, identifying the processes that are outlined by official documents to determine functions and process lines of control. Third, determine TRADOC's theoretical underpinnings as an organization and leverage those principles. Finally, constructively criticize what TRADOC does right and wrong, while making feasible and acceptable recommendations. The main research question for this monograph is how can TRADOC improve its effectiveness?

⁷ Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, *The "Virtual Corporation" and Army Organization* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1997), 6.

⁸ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Transition Team Discussion" (brief presented to GEN Wallace 2005), slide 29.

Organization and Methodology

This monograph divides the main research question into eight subordinate questions. In answering those questions, logical, feasible, acceptable, and suitable recommendations will be presented. Of course in doing so, the main research question will have been answered. The eight subordinate questions are:

1. Why was TRADOC formed?
2. What are the lessons learned from its creation?
3. What are TRADOC's mission and functions?
4. What documents direct TRADOC's actions?
5. How have those functions influenced TRADOCs' organization?
6. What is the structural theory behind TRADOC's organizational structure?
7. What is TRADOC's current organizational structure?
8. What are the criticisms of that structure?

Chapter 2 "The Origins of TRADOC" sets the foundation and explores the creation of TRADOC and the challenges that the founders experienced. These lessons learned are essential to carry over to future reorganization attempts. The wrong team can derail a perfect plan. Chapter 3 "TRADOC's Mission, Functions and Supporting Structure" explains what TRADOC is mandated to do and the organizational structure that supports it. It points out where to find TRADOC's mandates, explores the theoretical principles of its organizational structure and describes TRADOC's current structure that is charged with carrying out the identified mission and functions. Chapter 4 "Structural Critique" describes what TRADOC does right and where it fails in regards to the theoretical principles identified in Chapter 3 along with comparisons to other staff organizational structures in the rest of the Military. Chapter 5 "Increasing Effectiveness"

provides a hypothetical course of action incorporating the lessons learned in Chapter 2 and the structural recommendations in Chapter 4 to answer the main research question and provide a realistic solution.

The use of primary and secondary sources is the main research method for this monograph. Initially, the study explores the historical origins of TRADOC to discover the thought process behind its formation and how personalities can influence an organization's attempt to reorganize. Surprisingly, there is very little information on the founding of TRADOC. Without such documentation, limited secondary sources were the primary means to gather the information needed to accurately present the challenges that were incurred during TRADOC's formation.

TRADOC's mission and functions will be derived by an in depth study of current regulations and codes. Its structure will be described using Frederick Taylor's organizational theory titled *Principles of Scientific Management*. These principles will be used as a metric to identify shortcomings of TRADOC's current structure and therefore leading to potential recommendations. This study will end by providing recommendations that the TRADOC leadership can undertake to foster better integration military wide and strengthen the command and control lines from Headquarters (HQ) TRADOC to the Centers of Excellence. Recommendations will be gathered from lessons learned, results of the theoretical comparison, and logical conclusions based on comparisons with other military organizational structures.

Living in a time with limited resources and future cuts on the horizon is not the time to have an organization that is structurally different and has loose command and control lines. TRADOC is a needed organization, but looking structurally different and having loose command and control lines may cause doubt in the minds of senior Army civilian leadership on TRADOC's relevancy. Some may think that if TRADOC cannot get on board with the rest of the military by simply standardizing their staff and having clear command and control lines to improve integration and production, how can it meet the needs of the Army?

CHAPTER TWO

THE ORIGINS OF TRADOC

Before organizations can attempt to reorganize, it is important to examine why they were formed in the first place. By gaining this understanding, the leadership of the organization fully realizes their organization's original purpose, mission, and challenges in creation. Without this examination, organizations run the risk of developing into something that they were never originally intended for. This migration to an entirely different purpose is similar to the idea of mission shift, which "occurs when forces adopt tasks not initially included that, in turn, lead to mission expansion."⁹ Mission shift is a negative attribute because it distorts the organization's focus, which may result in low morale and productivity. The challenges in creation are also important to explore. Lessons learned from past attempted and successful reorganizations can be applied to future reorganization endeavors.

This chapter lays out the history of the creation of TRADOC and the challenges associated with it. It will be discovered that when responsibilities were divided between FORSCOM and TRADOC, the former was aligned with a single focus of war fighting, while the latter was charged with the responsibility of everything else. Understanding this provides an explanation of how TRADOC was formed with so many diverse and seemingly unrelated functions. This chapter also points out that to foster organizational change, the process to execute change is almost as important as the change itself. Not having the right team to spearhead a project will lead to failure.

⁹ Adam B. Siegel, "Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?" *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 2000): 112.

When U.S. Forces began to withdraw from Vietnam in the summer of 1969, the Army found itself in absolute turmoil. The American public was frustrated with how the Vietnam War was conducted and perceived the war as a failure. Politicians aligned themselves to deflect as much bad publicity as possible by distancing themselves from the war and the Army knew that it would be facing a reduction in resources, but had to maintain superiority over the rapidly expanding Soviet Army. Faced with a potentially overwhelming task to restructure the Army in light of a perceived lost war and imminent reduction in resources, Army Generals William E. DePuy, Bruce C. Palmer Jr., and Creighton Abrams Jr., led the Army in reorganizing into the organization that is present today.

This reorganization was much more than just a shuffling of duties of the stateside Army to pacify the Executive Branch and the Congress after a war. “The Army’s reorganization was an extraordinary, internally directed move to develop improved control of the management of the Army and, consequently, increased the autonomy of the Army under the direction of the professional, uniformed officers.”¹⁰ It was recognized that the Army was not structured in a way that allowed it to conduct operations as well and train, equip, and organize forces. At the time, CONARC had responsibility for all of the numbered corps and divisions as well as all of the Army installations across the United States. “With such a wide control span, together with responsibilities for both the training and education establishment and for unit readiness, many observers felt CONARC obligations were too broad for efficient focus.”¹¹

Lieutenant General (LTG) William E. DePuy’s foresight recognized the need of the Army to reorganize itself because of the new challenges presented from a reduction in resources

¹⁰ James A. Bowden, “Operation Steadfast: the United States Army Reorganizes Itself” (student research and writing project, Marine Corps Command and Staff, 1985), 10.

¹¹ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Military History Office. *Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command 1973-1988*, by Anne W. Chapman, Carol J. Lilly, John L. Romjue and Susan Canedy (Fort Monroe 1998), 10.

following the Vietnam War. “The Vietnam War had cost the Army a generation of weapons modernization. The Post-Vietnam drawdown left the Army in the same hollow condition it had been after previous wars, even as the Warsaw Pact countries continued to modernize their ground forces.”¹² This led him to establish an ad hoc task force to look at the organization of the Department of the Army. He was concerned that if “the Army failed to influence the process of cutting back, then it might have been reduced and controlled with a capriciousness and completeness far exceeding”¹³ anyone’s expectations. Unsurprisingly, the task force concluded that CONARC was over tasked, Combat Developments Command (CDC) was under resourced, Army Materiel Command (AMC) did not include a life-cycle management for equipment, and personnel management was fragmented among three agencies that created confusion. Within the scope of this paper, only CONARC and CDC will be examined in depth since TRADOC was formed out of these two organizations. Other agencies will be mentioned when appropriate to stress the extensiveness of the issue.

The Parker Panel

Upon completion of LTG DePuy’s report, GEN Westmoreland appointed MG David S. Parker to chair a review panel titled “The Parker Panel”. The purpose of this panel was to further continue the work chartered by LTG DePuy by examining the processes conducted by CONARC, CDC, AMC, and the Department of the Army Staff. This panel’s inquiry would not include tactical organizations.¹⁴ “Specifically, the panel would look at the allocation of functions within the Army Staff and the major CONUS commands. It would look at proposals for alternative

¹² Richard M. Swain, compiled *Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), pp. 75-112.

¹³ Bowden, p. 15.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army. *Report of the Special Review Panel on Department of the Army Organization*, (Washington D.C. 1971), 1-1.

organization and management practices which would help the Army operate with reduced resources. The panel would recommend procedures to carry out the changes.”¹⁵

In January 1970, The Parker Panel, comprised of 13 officers and a civilian budget expert, interviewed numerous officers, both active and retired, and leaders of major civilian corporations. The purpose of those interviews was to gain an understanding of the division of labor and processes in their respective organizations, then compare and contrast those findings with the Army’s structure at that time. The intent was to determine what organizational structure worked best in large organizations that had numerous functions. For example, executives with IBM were interviewed to see how their processes were executed in their organization where there was a vast scope of responsibilities ranging from research and development to distribution of products. These processes were very similar to what the Army faced at the time in reference to developing new combat systems and fielding combat units for war. By early spring 1970, the panel’s initial findings were that there were overlapping responsibilities in the Army and that the various staffs would compete for power when more than one agency was responsible for the same function.¹⁶

Panel determinations were that there were too many higher headquarters without any one headquarter designated as the lead. For example, AMC, CDC, Office, Chief of Research and Development (OCD), Office, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (ODCSOPS), and the Office of the Assistant Vice Secretary of the Army (OAVCSA) were all involved in the research, development, and acquisition of materiel for the Army. It was possible for more than two organizations to be responsible of developing different components of the same weapons systems. What could result was a tank that could mechanically operate, but not have any ammunition. CDC should have been the lead for combat developments, but was an organization in name only

¹⁵ Bowden, p. 18.

and did not have the resources to execute the function that it was created for. CDC must “seek out and be receptive to new concepts and ideas; a task made more difficult by separation from the Army’ two primary sources of ideas, the CONARC schools and the Army Materiel Command (AMC) laboratories.”¹⁷ The problem was that without resources to adequately perform this function, CONARC picked up where CDC left off resulting in two organizations performing the same function, but without any type of integrating mechanism. “Consequently, the officer in CONARC who was supposed to monitor the training in one of the Army schools had no correspondent at CDC who could write doctrine. The officer at CONARC would have to fill both functions.”¹⁸

CONARC was not without criticism. The panel determined that CONARC’s four functions of individual education and training, force development, force employment, and support and service were beyond its span of control. CONARC was responsible for the resourcing and management of 42 Army posts, 24 schools, and 285 College ROTC programs in the United States.¹⁹ It was unreasonable to think that one command could manage so many different missions. Let alone allocate limited resources appropriately so each critical function would receive its appropriate share of the Army budget.

What resulted were numerous second and third order effects. “Since CDC did not contribute to the development of doctrine and materiel requirements, it could not effectively contribute to the planning and programming aspects of the budget cycle” and “CONARC did not incorporate new doctrine into its training and educational programs.”²⁰ LTG DePuy also believed that since CDC did not have the resources to develop doctrine and CONARC was not

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ *Report of the Special Review Panel on Department of the Army Organization*, p. II-16-6.

¹⁸ Bowden, p. 25.

¹⁹ *Report of the Special Review Panel on Department of the Army Organization*, p. II-15-5.

²⁰ Bowden, p. 25.

officially responsible for it, doctrine development was left up to the individual schools. “If CONARC is to look at relative costs and installation management, they can’t do anything else. They can’t be the instrument for getting new ideas into young leaders.”²¹

Unfortunately, with any notion of change there are those who are against it for one reason or another. For the most part, even with all of the conflicts and duplication of processes brought forth by The Parker Panel, “General (GEN) Westmoreland did not want to change things. For example, he did not want to split CONARC into two separate commands”²² So, he directed a new special panel review that would look at only CONARC and CDC with the rest of the recommendations of The Parker Panel to be staffed by the Army staff. Besides CONARC and CDC, he wanted the rest of the recommendations to be stifled by the Army’s bureaucracy and not carried to fruition.

The new special review panel was not without criticism. “The Commanding General of CONARC, GEN Woolnough, was the most adamant in his opposition to the recommendations of the panel. He argued that CONARC was responsible for individual and unit training. Furthermore, all of the units, training centers, and schools support CONARC’s training mission.”²³ He felt that dividing CONARC in any way would force issues up to the Army staff where originally they could be handled at the CONARC headquarters. A cynical view of GEN Woolnough’s position would be that he was trying to maintain his power as the CONARC commander and not have it diluted by the Army staff. This of course is only the author’s opinion.

As with any review that recommends changes for an organization, there is always the possibility that the process could be captured and the necessary changes would not be

²¹ William E. DePuy, “Briefing for AVOofSA”, MFR, 19 May 1970. quoted in James A. Bowden “Operation Steadfast: the United States Army Reorganizes Itself” (student research and writing project, Marine Corps Command and Staff, 1985), 28.

²² Bowden, p. 31.

²³ Ibid., 33.

implemented. This is what happened to The Parker Panel. After almost 18 months of gathering data and reviewing recommendations, GEN Westmoreland chose to maintain the status quo. CONARC would still be overwhelmed by its span of control and CDC would still be ineffective because of a lack of resources and structure. The reason for the panel's ineffectiveness was due to a lack of guidance on GEN Westmoreland's part and the fact that all of the data gathered and processed was done by those who had a vested interest in the outcome of maintaining the status quo. If GEN Westmoreland really wanted to change the Army, he would have communicated his vision then commissioned a neutral party to gather data and provide recommendations. If The Parker Panel had been successful, subsequent reviews would not have been necessary.

The Reorganization of 1972

With The Parker Panel fading into history, the problems identified did not disappear. CONARC was still too large of an organization to manage unit readiness, training, and program management appropriately. With such a large span of control, the only thing that CONARC could control was their budget. However, they did not do this very well either. This is because "CONARC did not know what they were spending money for when they divided their budget among the Continental Armies."²⁴ The Continental Armies would then further divide their money to their subordinate elements of Divisions, schools, training centers, and installations. Budgets were based solely on dollar amounts and not connected to programs. As the Army continued to withdraw from Vietnam with subsequent cutbacks in resources from Congress, cuts were made across the board with the lowest echelon receiving the greatest cut after the higher headquarters took their share.

²⁴ Ibid., 60.

In 1971, LTG DePuy once again had the job of reviewing CONARC for a possible reorganization and “he accepted it with enthusiasm.”²⁵ Unlike The Parker Panel, LTG DePuy would use a small-disassociated group of 15 officers led by LTC Louis Menetrey, stationed at West Point to conduct the review and provide recommendations. Using an anonymous group of this size would guard against the process being captured as it did under MG David S. Parker and would allow for an unbiased analytical review.

LTC Menetrey methodically led the small group from broad concepts to specific proposals. It was an iterative process where a proposal or recommendation was suggested, and then the group would discuss its impacts on the organization and whether the proposal or recommendation led them to their end state of making CONARC more relevant. These proposals would then be briefed to LTG DePuy and he would provide the necessary guidance for the group to proceed. In time, these ideas developed into a rough campaign plan that identified specific implications. Learning from MG Parker’s experience, LTG DePuy kept all of the progress made close hold until he could get senior Army leader buy-in.

LTG DePuy though was just as much concerned with the presentation of his group’s ideas as with the information itself. On Saturdays, he would meet with a select few individuals from the team and they would layout “the idea of what the briefing charts would be.”²⁶ He was basically “planning the plan” which is a concept taught at the School of Advanced Military Studies on how to lay out a presentation that displays the right information. LTG DePuy’s goal was to lead his audience through the different arguments to the point where his audience would come to the same conclusion that he already had. His team unfortunately did not have the convenience of power point and had to create all of their briefing slides on butcher paper.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 63.

While LTG DePuy was working on his concept for a new Army, GEN Haines the CONARC commander was ready to present his staff's report titled CONARC 72. "Since GEN Haines of CONARC could be expected to present the most opposition to the reorganization, the timing of the meeting was fortunate for the proponents of change."²⁷ This gave LTG DePuy's team an opportunity to discover the arguments in opposition to change and adjust their own products accordingly to address any issues.

GEN Haines presented his staff's review from a defensive stance. GEN Haines refuted any criticism placed on his command as mismanagement by the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). He believed that CONARC was designed and intended for training, readiness, and operations of forces. Everything else was additional functions that his command should not be responsible for executing. For example, "there had been a recent trend toward creating both small functional commands and special functional assistants for the Volunteer Army initiatives, drug programs, etc. These actions had caused burdens for HQ, CONARC by generating resource requirements and creation of parallel monitoring staff elements without resource allocations."²⁸ He also blamed any shortcomings of his command on a lack of talented officers that, in his opinion, were being hoarded at HQDA. Therefore, his solution was to cut nonessential missions, place combat developments under his command, and have HQDA equally distribute talented officers all across the force. He never addressed the fact that CONARC was overburdened with its core missions.

While GEN Haines was selling his plan for reorganization, LTG DePuy was finishing his own version. To meet the rigors of criticism while he pitched his plan, LTG DePuy set up a series of murder boards to identify any shortcomings or resistance his plan for reorganization may face. "When DePuy was confident that the briefing was where it should be he scheduled meetings with

²⁷ Ibid., 64.

the Vice and the Chief.”²⁹ LTG DePuy was clearly poised for success because he understood and identified the problem, laid out a plan to sell his idea, and understood the political environment in which he would be operating.

With approval from the Vice, Chief, and Secretary of Defense, LTG DePuy knew that he still needed buy-in from the Army Staff and other senior Army officers in order for his proposed plan for reorganization to be successful. To overcome those wanting to derail his efforts, LTG DePuy set up a series of briefs to the Army Staff. At the briefs, he allowed dissent to be discussed then would interject with a logical argument and reasoning justifying the reorganization that most professional military leaders found hard to dispute. His argument was that training and doctrine should be under one organization because doctrine drives training and training provides input to doctrine. Having CDC responsible for doctrine and training under CONARC separated, effective doctrine and training development was hampered. Additionally, LTG DePuy pointed out that CONARC was just too large and cumbersome of an organization to be effective. LTG DePuy presented other arguments on projected efficiencies that could be gained under his proposed reorganization, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. In the end, it was recommended that CONARC be divided into a Force Command, headquartered at Fort McPherson, GA, and a Doctrine and Training Command headquartered at Fort Monroe, VA.

Understandably, GEN Haines was not pleased with the recommendation. He immediately met with the Chief of Staff of the Army to voice his opposition. With his request to stop the reorganization not being received, GEN Haines tried to capture the process by volunteering to lead the effort for the reorganization. In his pursuit, Operation Steadfast was born. The term Steadfast was taken from the 4th Infantry Division’s motto “Steadfast and Loyal”. Ironically,

²⁸ Ibid., 66.

²⁹ Ibid., 70.

GEN Haines did not subscribe to the “loyal” aspect since he was trying to derail a decision made by his superiors.

Operation Steadfast

On February 16, 1972 GEN Haines presented five major points at a luncheon with the Chief of Staff. He argued the development of the plan on a very close hold basis by the Department of Army staff officers neglected the “installation point of view” for feasibility and desirability. Second, he felt the study did not deal with a mobilization situation. Third, he did not feel that two new headquarters could be organized within the spaces presently authorized for CONARC. He thought some spaces could be saved at intermediate levels as the automatic data processing systems for personnel, logistics, and financial management for base operations came on line. Fourth, he felt strongly that the number of continental Armies should not be reduced from four to three. Finally, he argued against the timing of a major reorganization of the Army. “He let all of his arrows fly.”³⁰

Despite GEN Haines’ best efforts, GEN Westmoreland directed the reorganization to move forward, but did concede to GEN Haines by extending the reorganization to two years vice the original four and a half months originally proposed. GEN Westmoreland also agreed to examine more closely the reduction of numbered armies and the location of Forces Command Headquarters, but did not make any promises that changes would result. “Finally, GEN Westmoreland stated that he felt the job at U.S. Continental Army Command was too big for one individual, although he complimented GEN Haines on his performance of duty in that assignment.”³¹ Even though GEN Haines did not completely succeed in his efforts, he was

³⁰ Ibid., 82.

³¹ U.S. Army Forces Command Historical Office. *Operation STEADFAST Historical Summary: A History of Reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command (1972-1973)*, by Jean R. Moenk, 31, (Fort McPherson, 1974), 42.

allowed to stay in charge of the CONARC transition. Four-star generals who fall on their swords and fail are still given the opportunity to make a difference, despite their personal preferences.

With everyone on board, preliminary work began on Operation Steadfast. As with any good plan a series of stages were established to ensure and track progress. Operation Steadfast was broken into three stages:³²

Stage one – Determine feasibility and a conduct preliminary validation of the concept.

Stage two – Develop a detailed plan, resolve any issues, and conduct a final validation of the concept.

Stage three – Implement the plan.

Stage one set the conditions for the subsequent stages. Determining feasibility was just a formality to establish credibility since LTG DePuy's work already determined that the reorganization was possible. The preliminary validations of the concept outlined the goals and objectives to be accomplished. Operation Steadfast directed the formation of two new commands, U.S. Army Forces Command, headquartered at Fort McPherson and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, headquartered at Fort Monroe. The overall plan would save approximately \$13.5 million dollars annually, and produce a manpower savings of 1,289 spaces.³³ It was also noted that grade structures for military and civilians would have to be revalidated and there was a distinct possibility that reductions in grade would have to be made.

Once the preliminary information was released, GEN Haines once again went out on the offense to derail the reorganization. He inundated the Steadfast task force at HQDA with additional reasons why the reorganization should not go forward, or at a minimum be postponed. Under Secretary of Defense Belieu grew concerned that GEN Haines may attempt to capture the process by leaking information to key governmental leaders that would have issues with the

³² Bowden, p. 100.

reorganization. To quiet GEN Haines for the last time, GEN Westmoreland contacted him through backchannels to have him cease all criticism. Mr. Belieu “wanted to be able to present a package to the Secretary of Defense which would present the forward looking image of the reorganization to the Department of Defense and the public.”³⁴

Stage two provided the substance for the operation. MG Kalergis, appointed as the project manager, was responsible for the planning and coordination of all directed changes. Understandably, there was tension because the implementers of the plan were also the commanders of the organizations being reorganized. Even with this tension though, the commanders knew that their opportunity to facilitate change on their own terms had passed and that they had to be part of the solution instead of part of the problem. Stage two concluded with a written executive summary of the organization in addition to three books which described the sequential actions for the reorganization to take place.³⁵ As prescribed, TRADOC would be responsible for “the development, direction, management, and supervision of individual training for the Active Army and the Reserve Components as well as for formulating and documenting concepts, doctrine, training literature, materiel requirements, and organization for the Army as a whole.”³⁶ FORSCOM would command all operational units of the Army as well as the U.S. Army Reserve.

After working through other issues outside of the formation of TRADOC and FORSCOM stage three was implemented. On 26 February 1973, General Order number seven, approved by GEN Abrams, states “effective 1 March 1973, United States Army Combat Developments Command is relieved from assignment to Headquarters, Department of the Army,

³³ *Operation STEADFAST Historical Summary: A History of Reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command (1972-1973)*, p. 91.

³⁴ Bowden, p. 106.

³⁵ *Operation STEADFAST Historical Summary: A History of Reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command (1972-1973)*, p. 136.

as a major Army command and assigned as a subordinate major command of United States Continental Army Command.”³⁷ Then on 18 May 1973, GEN Abrams signed General Order number sixteen stating:

Effective 1 July 1973, the United States Army Forces Command is established as a major Army Command under the jurisdiction of Headquarters, Department of the Army, with Headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia,...the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command is established as a major Army Command under the jurisdiction of Headquarters, Department of the Army, with Headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and the United States Army Combat Developments Command, a subordinate major command of the United States Continental Army Command, is discontinued.³⁸

The functions of the Combat Developments Command were absorbed by the newly formed TRADOC.

Operation Steadfast was one of the largest reorganizations the United States Army has ever undergone. Its result was the formation of two major commands that are functionally aligned with TRADOC focused on training and doctrine, and FORSCOM focused on war fighting. “The TRADOC-FORSCOM arrangement solved the span-of-control problem, put combat developments back into the schools, and focused the development of the Army’s tactical organizations, weapons, and equipment, doctrine, and the training of soldiers in that doctrine, in one command.”³⁹ With this these new organizations in place, the Army was able to overcome lost time in weapons development during the Vietnam War and develop its role in NATO which resulted in winning the Cold War and poised the U.S. Army for future successes ranging from Operation Just Cause in Panama to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

³⁶ Ibid., 137.

³⁷ General Orders #7, (Washington D.C., 26 February 1973), Downloaded from <http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/go7307.pdf>.

³⁸ General Order #16, (Washington D.C., 18 May 1973), Downloaded from <http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/go7316.pdf>.

³⁹ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Military History Office. *Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command 1973-1988*, by Anne W. Chapman, Carol J. Lilly, John L. Romjue and Susan Canedy (Fort Monroe 1998), 7.

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from the creation of TRADOC into the organization that it is today are invaluable for future reorganizations. From the Parker Panel, it can be learned that from a structural view, organizations cannot adequately perform their functions if their span of control is too great or there are too many higher headquarters focusing on one function or subordinate organization. It was also learned that with any reorganization attempt, there will be those who will try to capture the process to derail it. Many groups or individuals are adverse to change for one reason or another due to loss of power or jobs. It is also important to consider that those groups or individuals can be superiors, peers, or subordinates.

The Reorganization of 1972 showed that in some instances in order to be successful in reorganization, a small hand picked anonymous group might have to be established to champion the project. This protects the group from outside influences and dampens alternative agendas from derailing the entire project. LTG DePuy protected the process from the same fate that the Parker Panel suffered. It can also be learned that presentation is just as important as content and that your presentation may have to change depending on the audience. It is also essential in reorganization attempts to have senior leader buy in prior to briefing the organization at large. From Operation Steadfast we can learn that when lessons learned are applied from previous attempts, success is not guaranteed, but more likely. Finally, by examining the history of TRADOC one gains an appreciation of how it was formed into the organization that it is today with such a broad and diverse mission.

CHAPTER THREE

TRADOC's MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

TRADOC recruits, trains and educates the Army's Soldiers; develops leaders; supports training in units; develops doctrine; establishes standards; and builds the future Army.⁴⁰

TRADOC Mission Statement

Once the history of an organization has been examined and lessons learned have been gleaned, the organizations current functions must be explored in detail in order to gain an understanding of why an organization is structured the way it is and gain some insight for improvement of that structure. This will be done in this chapter by exploring the mandates that dictate TRADOC's mission and functions, and the resulting organizational structure to accomplish them. It will be evident that with such a diverse mission, TRADOC has developed an organizational structure that is complex, confusing, and therefore not as effective as it could be.

Starting with the Constitution, Article 1 Section 8 states "the Congress shall have Power To...raise and support Armies."⁴¹ This statute provides the foundation for TRADOC's mission as it is responsible for the training of those Armies. It is important to make this connection back to the Constitution for it provides legitimacy for TRADOC's purpose in the totality of the Army. No other Army organization fulfills the training and doctrine development role that TRADOC provides.

⁴⁰ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Website, <http://www-tradoc.army.mil/about.htm>, accessed 15 January 2006.

⁴¹ The National Archives Experience. http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/constitution_transcript.html.

With TRADOC's role firmly supported by the Constitution, United States Code Title 10 section 3013 further defines the Army's purpose and therefore more specifically TRADOC's implied responsibilities. The code specifies that:

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions: (1) Recruiting. (2) Organizing. (3) Supplying. (4) Equipping (including research and development). (5) Training. (6) Servicing. (7) Mobilizing. (8) Demobilizing. (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel). (10) Maintaining. (11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment. (12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.⁴²

From this, it is implied that TRADOC is responsible for the functions of recruiting, organizing, training, and the research development portion of equipping. Army Materiel Command (AMC) does the actual equipping function through the acquisition process. The remaining functions are performed by other major commands within the Army.

DoD directive 5100.1 also dictates the roles, missions, and functions of the Army and the implied tasks for TRADOC. The directive states, "the Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war."⁴³ The Army has the responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide Army forces for land, air and missile defense, joint amphibious, airborne, special, space, and psychological (PSYOPs) operations. The directive also states that the Army will "develop doctrines and procedures, in coordination with the other Military Services, for organizing, equipping, training, and employing forces operating

⁴² Cornell Law School U.S. Code collection.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00003013----000-.html.

⁴³ Department of Defense Directive 5100.1,
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d51001x.htm>.

on land.”⁴⁴ Therefore, TRADOC is inherently responsible for the organizing, training, equipping, and doctrine development, while FORSCOM is responsible for providing forces. With these mandates alone, it is easy to recognize the enormous responsibility TRADOC has within the Army.

With the Constitution, United States Code, and DoD directives outlining Army responsibilities and implied TRADOC tasks, Army Regulations (AR) and Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA PAM) spell them out in explicit detail. There are currently five ARs and one DA PAM that do just that. To begin, DA PAM 10-1 (Organization of the United States Army) defines TRADOC’s over all responsibility. It outlines:

The warfighting units of the Combatant Unified Commands require doctrine for strategic, operational, and tactical warfare and operations other than war. The units must then train to ensure success, using the appropriate doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Many elements of the Army have specific combat development and training responsibilities, and they all are integrated by the Army’s principal combat developer.⁴⁵

That principle combat developer is the TRADOC commander, “who has responsibility to guide and coordinate the Army’s total combat development effort.”⁴⁶

What is combat development? It is a concept “based on warfighting concepts and doctrine. It includes organizational and force structure design, equipment, and sustainment systems and is interwoven with the training of soldiers.”⁴⁷ TRADOC’s responsibilities encompass joint coordination of doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; analysis of Army capabilities; and training and leader development across all skill levels.⁴⁸ This also implies that Army combat developments will be coordinated and integrated horizontally across services and vertically across levels of command throughout the DoD.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, *Organization of the United States Army*, (Washington, D.C., 14 June 1994), 27.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

AR 5-22 (The Army Proponent System), which identifies functional proponent responsibilities, identifies similar responsibilities as compared to DA PAM 10-1. As stated in AR 5-22 the TRADOC commander is designated as commanding, “the principal Army school system, training centers, Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, and national defense cadet corps programs; and is the principal Army combat developer.”⁴⁹ Again, this regulation clearly designates TRADOC as the lead combat developer as well as the lead trainer for the Army.

AR 70-1 (Army Acquisition Policy) outlines similar responsibilities, but from an acquisition perspective. According to the AR, the TRADOC Commander will serve as the principal Combat developer and Training Developer with the responsibility to formulate concepts and identify requirements for future systems. These future systems must be integrated throughout the Army as well as DoD to ensure interoperability. This is a very important concept since all new combat systems must be able to be integrated with other systems. The military can no longer afford to stovepipe systems. Along with developing combat systems, the TRADOC commander is also responsible for the training development for these new emerging concepts so that complete materiel and training programs are delivered to the warfighter.⁵⁰

An example of this is the development and future fielding of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). Following the end of the Gulf War, the services realized that they could not communicate with each other. The Air Force would be using one frequency and type of radio, while the Army was using something completely different and therefore could not communicate between themselves. The Navy had the same problem. It was mandated by Joint Forces Command that all new radio systems had to be able to communicate with each other in order to

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of the Army Regulation 5-22, *The Army Proponent System*, (Washington, D.C., 10 March 1986), 2.

⁵⁰ U.S. Department of the Army Regulation 70-1, *Army Acquisition Policy*, (Washington, D.C., 31 December 2003), 25.

alleviate future potential communications problems. The reality though was that the services were still fielded with legacy equipment. It would take tens of years before new equipment could replace old equipment and meet the new criteria that all radios must be able to communicate with one another. To overcome this challenge, TRADOC and one of its subordinate commands, the United States Army Signal School, was tasked with the mission to develop an interim radio that would fulfill the criteria of being able to communicate across different waveform platforms. Hence, the JTRS concept was developed.

From a force development perspective, AR 71-32 (Force Development and Documentation-Consolidated Policies) assigns the TRADOC commander the responsibility to “Lead the Army in developing and validating battlefield requirements and use the force design update (FDU) process as the semiannual Army process to update organizational concepts and designs.”⁵¹ With this assigned mission, TRADOC is responsible for developing organizational concepts and designs in order to meet personnel requirements for newly designed forces. TRADOC is also responsible for developing equipment usage profiles to determine lifecycle replacement and future fiscal impacts. Finally, TRADOC must insure that all manpower requirements from recruiting, training, and fielding are coordinated with the new force or equipment that is developed.

Referring back to our JTRS example, after the concept was developed, TRADOC was tasked as outlined in AR 71-32 to fully develop the concept for production. This was done through a series of conferences with the other services to determine operational requirements. For the Army, TRADOC also took the lead in developing budget and manpower requirements. When the JTRS development process is complete, the military will have a new radio that will be able to accept any waveform thereby solving the problem of connectivity between the services. For the

Army, TRADOC will have developed tasks, conditions, and standards for the training of the new radio, make any adjustments in manpower, schedule fielding and new equipment training, and provide a forecast on how the new system will impact future budgets. There is no other organization in the Army that can take a program from concept to fielding other than TRADOC.

With most of the other regulations focusing on combat developments or the materiel aspect of TRADOC's responsibility to the Army, AR 350-1 (Army Training and Leader Development) focuses primarily on TRADOC's responsibility to training. In this regulation, TRADOC is responsible for the development of unit and individual training along with their related training support packages. Additionally, TRADOC is responsible for the development and publishing of training policies and procedures, guidance for the development of training products and training support products, training doctrine field manuals (FM) and supporting pamphlets, and training evaluation programs. Serving as the lead trainer for the Army, TRADOC also develops and executes collective training to meet the Army collective training goals. This is done by TRADOC serving as the Army's functional proponent for Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), and developing policy and guidance for the management, planning, development and implementation of collective training. This is accomplished in conjunction with identifying and prioritizing training resources, serving as the Army's collective task manager, exercising quality control over all aspects of training, and serving as the Army's information manager on all training doctrine publications and automation databases.⁵²

Again, back to our JTRS example, with the material concept developed TRADOC was then responsible for developing, fielding, and implementing a training package to support the new radio. This included updating advanced individual training programs of instruction, overseeing

⁵¹ U.S. Department of the Army Regulation 71-32, *Force Development and Documentation-Consolidated Policies* (Washington D.C., 03 March 2003), 10.

the development and publication of technical manuals, and developing individual training requirements. TRADOC is responsible for all training the Army conducts from tooth to tail whether it being new or currently fielded systems.

Finally, AR 10-87 (Major Army Commands in the Continental United States) summarizes TRADOC's missions and functions. It states that the "mission of TRADOC is to prepare the Army for war, be the architect of the future, and foster organizational excellence."⁵³ This is accomplished through TRADOC conducting all concept and doctrine development, developing and maintaining the Army's training system, and conducting all combat developments including coordination and integration horizontally and vertically across the military. In regards to functions, TRADOC accomplishes its purpose through the six related missions of training, leader development, doctrine, force design, equipment requirements, and mission support.⁵⁴ TRADOC is the Army's one stop for everything outside of conducting combat operations.

Recruiting is the only TRADOC function not covered specifically by an AR or any other type of similar official federal regulation. It is covered by General Orders #1 dated 11 February 2004. In that, it establishes the United States Army Accessions Command (AAC) subordinate to TRADOC. ACC is responsible for initial entry training, recruiting, and military entry processing.⁵⁵ HQDA G-1 performed this function previously.

Laying the foundation with the previous ARs, DA PAMs, and other federal documents, TRADOC Regulation 10-5 distills TRADOC's mission statement and 11 core functions. Figure 1 summarizes the inputs. The main problem with all of these inputs is that they do not relate very

⁵² U.S. Department of the Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, (Washington D.C., 13 January 2006), 28.

⁵³ U.S. Department of the Army Regulation 10-87, *Major Commands in the Continental United States*, (Washington D.C., 30 October 1992), 21.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ General Orders #1, (Washington D.C., 11 February 2004), Downloaded from <http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/go0401.pdf>.

well with each other and TRADOC, as a single organization, is responsible to fulfill and integrate them. This collection of various functions has had a definite impact on TRADOC's command and control structure. TRADOC has taken on an organizational personality similar to the way it has been assigned functions. Just as TRADOC has assumed the previous unrelated functions that it is charged to integrate, its lines of command and control have become disjointed from standardized organizations in order to accomplish all of the mandated tasks. Additionally, having a staff structure other than a G-staff increases the difficulty with integration across major commands and other services.




Fig. 1. Inputs into TRADOC's Mission and Functions. ⁵⁶

TRADOC Structural Theory

TRADOC's overall organizational structure is classified as a traditional hierarchy that “was first developed in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as manufactures

and distributors sought to take advantage of economies scale opened up and an expanding national market.”⁵⁷ This traditional hierarchy is based on the research conducted by Frederick Winslow Taylor “whose book *Principles of Scientific Management* laid out the general principles underlying the organization of new mass production facilities like Henry Ford’s Highland Park, Michigan factory.”⁵⁸

Recognizing that Taylor’s theory is archaic, inflexible, and inefficient, it is still a relevant theory in order to describe how the Army is organized and how its processes are carried out. From a tactical perspective, every task has a definition along with a condition and standard. This is similar to Taylor’s “one best way” to shovel experiment where he systematically broke down the individual steps of “first-class shovelers” to determine the “one best way” to move the greatest tonnage per day.⁵⁹ From an operational perspective, look no further than calling for close air support (CAS). For its employment, there are strict planning requirements that adhere to a set timetable with distinct steps. If shortcuts are taken, the entire system can be thrown out of balance with the potential result of ground forces not receiving the type of support they need. Finally, from a strategic perspective, explore the mind numbing publication of *How the Army Runs*. This document provides in-depth, sometimes step-by-step, information on existing DoD systems and processes. Granted, in some management circles “Taylorism” is a negative attribute, but for the Army his theory still provides a foundation for organizational and process analysis. Now back to his principles.

The first of these four principles that Taylor has recognized is that “of the new burdens which are voluntary undertaken by those on the management side is the deliberate gathering

⁵⁶ Olin Strater, “Tradoc Redesign Team,” brief to Mr. Dave Buckley, 11 November 2005, Fort Leavenworth, powerpoint presentation, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, slide 3.

⁵⁷ Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, *The “Virtual Corporation” and Army Organization* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1997), 6.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

together of the great mass of traditional knowledge which, in the past has been the heads of the workmen, recording it, tabulating it, reducing it in most cases to rules, laws, and in many cases to mathematical formulae, which, with these new laws, are applied to the cooperation of the management to the work of the workmen.”⁶⁰ For TRADOC, this means that its leadership has the responsibility to identify processes that they are responsible for and establish lines of control. Responsibilities are delegated downward where superiors have direct oversight and control over subordinates. Thus, the organization structure resembles a pyramid.

The second of Taylor’s principles is the “selection of the workman, and then his progressive development.”⁶¹ From this principle, TRADOC must select and develop individual workers as well as developing the sub-organizations that they represent. “It becomes their duty to set out deliberately to train the workmen in their employ to be able to do a better and still better class of work than ever before.”⁶² The third principle is bringing together the processes that represent the science of an organization and the trained worker. Another way of stating this is brining together the right person to the right place at the right time in order to be productive. TRADOC does this by identifying requirements then assigning responsibility to the completion of those requirements by the appropriate organization. The final principle is the division of work. In this notion, Taylor communicates that work is divided between management and worker functions where management has to set the conditions for the worker to be productive. “There is hardly a thing he [the worker] does that does not have to be preceded by some act of preparation on the part of management.”⁶³ To summarize Taylor’s four principles, TRADOC has the responsibility to identify processes, train workers or subordinate organizations, match the process

⁵⁹ Robert B. Denhardt, *Theories of Public Organization*. (Belmont: Wadworth, 2004), 52.

⁶⁰ *The Principles of Scientific Management* by Frederick Winslow Taylor, ed. Jay M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott, *Classics of Organization Theory* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2001), 65.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁶² *Ibid.*

with the right worker or subordinate organization, and perform proper managerial staff preparation to set the conditions in order for the workers to succeed.

TRADOC Major Subordinate Command (MSC) and Staff Structures

Today, TRADOC is a major Army command (MACOM) consisting of HQ TRADOC, three Major Subordinate Commands and eight special activities led by Deputy Commanding Generals (DCG), Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS), or equivalents depending on level of responsibility (Figure 2). All TRADOC centers of excellence are aligned under an MSC, which has direct authority. “The HQ TRADOC staff consists of a command group, personal staff, coordinating staff, and special staff...it provides staff management, facilities external coordination, and assists the Deputy Commanding General, Chief of Staff (DCG/CofS) in the prioritization of resources.”⁶⁴

The staff and MSCs supervise TRADOCs eleven core functions while the centers of excellence prosecute each of those functions. The Combined Arms Center (CAC), located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “provides leadership and supervision for leader development and professional military and civilian education; institutional and collective training; functional training; training support; battle command doctrine; doctrine; and lessons learned.”⁶⁵ The CAC commander is also responsible for “providing guidance, leadership, and command supervision” to the centers of excellence “to ensure that training is safe, relevant, realistic and executed to Army standards.”⁶⁶

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 10-5, *Organizations and Functions*, (Fort Monroe, 09 March 2005), 10.

⁶⁵ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 10-5-1, *Headquarter, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command* (Fort Monroe, 26 January 2006), 33.




Fig. 2. TRADOC Organization Structure⁶⁷

The Futures center, even though technically part of the staff, acts as an MSC. “The Futures Center develops and integrates into a Joint warfighting environment, from concept to capability, all aspects of the future force. This DCG and his team develop and integrate Joint and Army concepts, architectures and doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities; validate science and technology priorities; and lead future-force experimentation.”⁶⁸ This integration also occurs with interagency and multinational

⁶⁶ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Website, <http://www-tradoc.army.mil/about.htm>, accessed 15 January 2006.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

organizations and therefore ties complete integration horizontally and vertically. Much of the work though is conducted at the center of excellence level. Looking back to JTRS as our example, even though the Futures Center was coordinating with agencies beyond TRADOC headquarters, the Signal Center carried out the concept development, doctrine writing, and experimentation.

The United States Army Accession Command is “responsible for the Army’s officer, warrant officer and enlisted accession process from first contact through completion of initial-military training...recruiting the force.”⁶⁹ The Accession Commander is also responsible for providing IMT policy and execution guidance to center commanders. This “encompasses reception-battalion operations that support IMT; basic combat training; advanced individual training; one-station unit training; Reserve Officer Training Corps; Officer Candidate School; Warrant Officer Candidate School; officer basic courses (which are transitioning to Basic Officer Leader Course Phases II and III); and recruiter, drill sergeant and other IMT cadre training.”⁷⁰

TRADOC’s staff structure is comprised of a personal staff, special staff, and coordinating staff (Figure 2). Deputy Chiefs of Staff or equivalent, such as the Chief Information Officer (CIO), lead the coordinating staff sections. The coordinating staff ensures coordination and integration of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) initiatives and acts as the primary interface with HQDA and other Services and Government organizations.⁷¹ The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Infrastructure, and Logistics (DCSPIL) prosecutes the functions that are similar to those performed by the G1 and 4. “The DCSPIL is the senior advisor to CG, TRADOC on military and civilian personnel, logistics, engineering, environmental, and integration of base support programs. The DCSPIL consists of

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

five directorates: Adjutant General, Logistics, Civilian Personnel, Engineer, and Integration and Support.”⁷²

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) performs functions similar to the G2:

The DCSINT serves as the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) for TRADOC. In the execution of SIO functions for the CG, TRADOC, the DCSINT operates ICW the HQDA G2. The DCSINT provides command interface with Army staff, other MACOMs, and national intelligence agencies to ensure timely and effective intelligence, threat, and security support across DOTMLPF. The DCSINT recommends policy, vision, and priorities; coordinates for resources; and conducts staff management of TRADOC’s intelligence and security operations.⁷³

DCSINT consists of 10 directorates that include: Futures; Security; Devil’s Advocate; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); Weather; and Opposing Forces (OPFOR); Threats; Wargaming; University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS); and the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training (DCSOPS&T) performs functions similar to the G3.

The DCSOPS&T provides staff management for training, leadership and education, long-range operational planning, and planning requirements related to Army and joint training goals; serves as the primary staff representative for interactions pertaining to training, leadership and education, and personnel development with HQDA, JFCOM, other MACOMs and agencies; supports Army operations, mobilization, and readiness requirements; synchronizes personnel developments activities of TRADOC centers and schools; maintains and operates the TRADOC Command Operations Center.⁷⁴

The DCSOPS&T consists of 10 directorates and three field operating activities. The directorates are Operations and Mobilization; Joint and Combined Arms Training; Leader Development and Education; Individual Training; Training Development and Delivery; Training Program Analysis

⁷¹ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 10-5, *Organizations and Functions*, (Fort Monroe, 09 March 2005), 10.

⁷² Ibid., 31

⁷³ Ibid., 27

⁷⁴ Ibid., 29.

and Evaluation; The Army School System; Training Plans and Capabilities Review; the Provost Marshal; and Personnel Proponency. The three field operating activities are [Army Training Support Center] ATSC, [Training Operations Management Activity] TOMA, and [Security Assistance Training Field Activity] SATFA.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management handles the resource management function of the G4.

The DCSRM formulates, allocates, administers, determines, and validates requirements for, and monitors the utilization of TRADOC resources--funding, manpower, and equipment--to execute TRADOC missions. The DCSRM also serves as the principal management and financial advisor to CG, TRADOC; assists major subordinate commanders and staff with finance, resource, and management matters; and is responsible for long-range planning, programming, receipt, distribution, and execution of all resources assigned to TRADOC.⁷⁵

The DCSRM executes these functions through four directorates that include: Budget; Manpower and Force Analysis; Planning, Analysis, and Evaluation; Finance and Accounting; and Management.

Finally, the Chief Information Officer handles the duties similar to a G6.

The TRADOC CIO is the principal adviser to CG, TRADOC for all matters relating to [Information Technology] IT, [Information Management] IM, and knowledge management (KM) necessary for the execution of TRADOC's mission. The CIO develops commandwide IT, IM, and KM plans, policies, and procedures and its business enterprise architecture. The CIO provides staff management for the resourcing, provision, development, acquisition, integration, operations, maintenance, and sustainment of IM, KM and IT applications, systems, and services for TRADOC.⁷⁶

The CIO consists of two directorates: Plans, Policies, and Resources, and Operations.

From the evidence provided, it is easy to understand just how complex of a mission TRADOC has. While other organizations have the simplicity of focusing on one function, FORSCOM for example, TRADOC is charged with everything from doctrine development to recruiting. To accomplish such a wide range of responsibilities and functions, TRADOC has

⁷⁵ Ibid., 32

⁷⁶ Ibid., 33.

developed a somewhat dysfunctional organizational structure. Granted, this structure does work, but it could be improved. Additionally, it does not help when the staff structure does not look like anything else the Army or sister services have.

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITIQUE

This chapter will critique TRADOC's current organizational structure by comparing it Taylor's theory. It will be found that TRADOC adheres to all of his principles except for the first one where an organization has the responsibility of establishing clear lines of command and control. Through this, it will also become evident that TRADOC does not follow the Army's doctrine of unity of command. Finally, it will be pointed out that TRADOC's current staff structure is not conducive to vertical and horizontal integration.

So that this critique is not completely one sided, it is important to point out what TRADOC does right. To begin with, TRADOC is a legitimate and needed organization. Since its inception, TRADOC has held to its charted functions and mission and has not deviated from its course. There is no other organization like it in the Army that has such a profound and diverse responsibility of recruiting, training, and educating the Army's Soldiers; developing leaders; supporting training units; developing doctrine; establishing standards; and building the future Army. As described earlier, this responsibility can be traced all the way back to the Constitution, so there is no doubt in anyone's mind the importance of TRADOC. From a functional viewpoint, TRADOC has assigned each of its core functions to an organization for responsibility and oversight and there is no duplication of effort unlike the environment of the Army during the Parker Panel review where multiple organizations may be responsible for the development of the same weapons systems.

To prove TRADOC's unique position is to look at its responsibility and function with regard to the Future Combat System (FCS):

The Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) network allows the FCS Family-of-Systems (FoS) to operate as a cohesive system-of-systems where the whole of its capabilities is greater than the sum of its parts. As the key to the Army's transformation, the network, and its logistics and Embedded Training (ET) systems, enable the Future Force to employ

revolutionary operational and organizational concepts. The network enables Soldiers to perceive, comprehend, shape, and dominate the future battlefield at unprecedented levels as defined by the FCS Operational Requirements Document (ORD).⁷⁷

TRADOC has the monumental task of ensuring that FCS comes to fruition and that all aspects of the program are integrated vertically and horizontally from the Army's perspective. Remember that TRADOC is the Army's architect of the future.

Take the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) that is part of the FCS concept. The Futures Center would task the Maneuver Center of Excellence to take the lead for this project. This makes absolute sense since the Maneuver Center is the proponent for infantry maneuver tactics. The Maneuver Center would propose a concept back to the futures center who would then solicit feedback from the other centers. The Signal Center would provide feedback on communications; the Logistics Center would provide feedback on logistics support; etc. This feedback would occur from every center where applicable. The Futures Center then would take the draft concept to a Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) and compare its concept and capabilities with the other services to ensure integration. Any discrepancies are sent back to the organization responsible for that function for mitigation. This process is continued until all issues have been worked through. This example is a clear indication of TRADOC's unique responsibility of horizontal and vertical integration. There is no other organization in the Army with the capability to fulfill this function.

From Taylor's perspective, TRADOC is complimented on its ability to fulfill the principles of two though four. Taylor's second principle says that an organization must properly select the right individuals to perform a particular task. Despite critics, TRADOC does this very well. There are standards in place for positions to be filled by individuals that hold a particular skill set or rank. These standards are applied to both civilian and military positions. An example

⁷⁷ Future Combat System Overview, <http://www.army.mil/fcs/factfiles/overview.html>, accessed 01

of this would be the selection of the School of Advanced Military Studies director. The job requires an Army colonel with planning experience. This protects the position from being filled by political appointees or as a favor to a senior Army leader. Not that the position could not be filled through some type of favor, but the individual that fills the position would at least hold the minimum qualifications.

Taylor's third principle is also maintained by TRADOC. To summarize, the principle states that an organization has the responsibility to bring together the right person and the right job at the right time. It is hard to argue that any organization under TRADOC is obsolete. Some may not be as important as others, but each organization under TRADOC has a specific mission to support TRADOC's overall purpose and function. For example, TRADOC no longer maintains a strategic nuclear office. The function that this office performed is no longer necessary in the contemporary operating environment where a nuclear weapon will not be used as a first strike option. That mindset went away along side the Berlin Wall.

Finally, Taylor's fourth principle denotes a division of work within an organization. Again, TRADOC does this very well. Each organization that falls under TRADOC is missioned with a unique function. It is hard to find duplication of effort unless it is self-induced. When this occurs, TRADOC is very responsive at reestablishing mission responsibilities.

Issues with Current Organization

The traditional hierarchy is not the optimal structure for an organization. There are many arguments on how traditional hierarchies are cumbersome and slow to adjust and develop. Even though those arguments may have merit, the reality is that TRADOC is a large bureaucratic organization where a traditional hierarchy still works. Changing TRADOC's fundamental organization into anything else would have to be preceded by a complete overhaul of the military's culture. Commanders will always have chains of command with subordinates. It is not that the Army has not tried other structures. "There were efforts to innovate with flat

organizations – most notably, with the Pentomic division of the 1950's which eliminated the battalion echelon and controlled five companies from each brigade headquarters. The Pentomic concept, developed largely as a means of dealing with tactical nuclear weapons in a land war, was scrapped by the end of the 1950s.”⁷⁸ The issue with TRADOC though is that it is not adhering to the principles set fourth by a traditional hierarchy construct.

The main issue is that of establishing lines of control for processes. Even though the Combined Arms Center commander rates the Centers of Excellence commanders, he is not the only person that can task them. The Futures Center, Accessions Command, and the TRADOC staff also have the ability to task that single Center of Excellence commander. Therefore, that Center of Excellence commander may have to answer to four different bosses even though one only rates them. The resulting structure looks more like an organization that has direct oversight of a subordinate organization, but not clear lines of command and control. Figure 3 was briefed to LTG Patreaus, CAC commander, in January of 2006 to demonstrate this point.




Fig. 3. TRADOC's Actual Structure⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, p. 39.

⁷⁹ Antonio Munera, "Redesign for Excellence Solution Strategies," brief to LTG Patreaus, 13 January 2006, Fort Leavenworth, powerpoint presentation, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, slide 29.

This structure and lack of clear lines of command causes an unwarranted amount of confusion and frustration when the Center commanders try to allocate resources against the tasks they are trying to prosecute. From a survey that went out to Center commanders to solicit their opinions on various questions, the Armor center pointed out that:

Currently there are three distinct DCGs capable of tasking center commandants. Although this is not necessarily a poor structure it does create resourcing issues. For example, the TRADOC yearly training guidance needs to more closely match the realities of requirements and abilities. By better integrating the priority list between TRADOC HQ, CAC, and AAC major projects can be properly resourced and redundancies in taskings can be avoided. CAC and AAC with their current structure are not organized to effectively integrate the individual centers.⁸⁰

This lack of a line of control clearly violates Taylor's first principle of a traditional hierarchy where it is the organizations responsibility to establish clear lines of control for processes. How can the Centers of Excellence be expected to deconflict requirements and allocate resources if they are being tasked indiscriminately by four different higher headquarters? The reality is that they cannot do it very well. It is therefore TRADOC's responsibility to establish those lines of control and hold the leaders of TRADOC HQ, CAC, and ACC to those established lines.

This is not the only criticism. With the Centers of Excellence having four different higher headquarters to respond to, this violates the Army's own doctrine. Under the Army's doctrinal concept of the principles of war, unity of command states, "for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander."⁸¹ Again, the current TRADOC structure does not adhere to this concept. Unity of command cannot be attained when the Centers of Excellence commanders respond to four higher headquarters. Doctrinally, by not adhering to this concept developing concepts or following processes is hindered. "Developing the full combat power of a

⁸⁰ Anthony Jones, Deputy Commanding General Training and Doctrine Command, "CoE Questions – Staff – Roll-up", Fort Monroe, p. 7.

force requires unity of command. Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority unifies action.”⁸²

From a historical perspective, even though the Parker Panel did not accomplish what it set out to attain, it was learned that when there are too many higher headquarters over one subordinate organization, confusion and duplication of effort might ensue. Similarly as having AMC, CDC, OCRD, and ODCSOPS overseeing one procurement program, TRADOC currently has AAC, FC, CAC, and HQ TRADOC providing oversight over one Center of Excellence. History may not repeat itself, but it can be used as a guide to learn lessons from experiences. Additionally, in the current environment of seeking efficiency from the Army senior leadership, if the TRADOC leadership does not take action to clean up its lines of operation, others may dictate it.

In actuality, TRADOC follows more of a spoke and hub concept where a lead, AAC, FC, CAC, or HQ TRADOC, is responsible for a function including assessment, integration, and production of products with the authority to task as necessary (Figure 4). This causes “multiple high priority tasks that cause confusion”⁸³ and this methodology completely violates Taylor’s first scientific principle, the Army’s doctrine of unity of command, and plain old common sense. This type of structure may work in the civilian world, but is not conducive to a large public bureaucracy.

⁸¹ U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington D.C., June 2001), 4-14.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ COL Richard Dixon, CAC G3, quote from briefing, 18 January 2006, Fort Leavenworth, video teleconference, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.




Fig. 4. TRADOC Spoke and Hub methodology.⁸⁴

TRADOC’s staff is also not without criticism. It is the only major command staff in the Army that is unique in title and structure. It does not look like any other staff. Instead of the contemporary G-Staff that everyone in the military is familiar with, TRADOC has a Deputy Chief of Staff construct that is a throwback to the founding of TRADOC. As every other command has changed and standardized their staffs to G-staffs, TRADOC has remained the same. This causes serious issues pertaining to vertical and horizontal integration across the Department of Defense and within the Army. If anyone has a personnel issue, instead of contacting the G-1 as in all other units, at TRADOC, the inquiring individual would have to contact DCSPII. This difference in titles and structure causes outside organizations to look at TRADOC with confusion because the staff does not look like the rest of the Army. Imagine how much easier it would be for a staff officer from another organization trying to coordinate an intelligence issue contacting TRADOC’s G2 instead of the current staff section of DCSINT. The phrase by GEN Wallace that “TRADOC looks goofy” makes a lot of sense.

Granted, TRADOC is a functioning organization but there is room for improvement. With the excepted fact that TRADOC follows a traditional hierarchy, it will only reach its full potential of effectiveness if the principles of a traditional hierarchy are maintained. As it has been pointed out, TRADOC lacks in the area of establishing clear process lines of command and

control. Interestingly, this also violates the Army doctrine of unity of command. Finally, TRADOC's staff organization must transform to come in line with the rest of DoD to enhance its vertical and horizontal integration.

⁸⁴ Munera, slide 29.

CHAPTER FIVE

INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS

TRADOC is a dynamic and needed organization in the Army. There is no other organization that is charged with such a diverse set of requirements. In the current political and military environment, TRADOC cannot afford any perceived inefficiencies or stand out as a different, odd looking, goofy, out of touch organization. Not having clear lines of command and control may result in duplication of information requirements from the requesting organizations and creates an unhealthy environment at the Center of Excellence level, which may result in low morale or productivity. Therefore, the focus of this chapter will be to provide feasible, acceptable, and suitable recommendations.

At Fort Gordon, Georgia, the author had the privilege of holding the position of Secretary General Staff (SGS), which is part of the Commanding General's command group. In that position, the author had the responsibility of tracking taskings sent from outside organizations requesting information or data from the Signal Center. Taskings that came from CAC, the Signal Center's higher headquarters, were tracked appropriately and answered by the suspense date. Issues would arise when taskings went straight to the Signal training brigade or other Fort Gordon organizations, by passing CAC and the command group. If any issues arose, the requester would go straight to CAC asking why the tasker was not answered on time or appropriately. CAC would then contact the Signal Center, the SGS to be exact, asking why the tasker that originated from a completely different organization was not answered. This would cause the SGS and Chief of Staff to completely stop what they currently were working in order to address this new issue. This environment caused undue stress, did not allow for prior planning and in some instances caused a shift in resources in order to address the late or inappropriately completed tasking. Having the tasker routed through CAC originally would have prevented the tasker from not being tracked and

completed appropriately. Without well defined lines of command and control, other organizations are not required to route taskings through CAC and have the option of going straight to the organization that has the needed information.

Another issue deals with resourcing. Without the CAC commander providing oversight, by being firmly set in the chain of command, outside organizations that outrank the Center of Excellence commanders may task that organization to accomplish a mission or task without the proper resources. This puts the Center of Excellence commanders in a tight position because it is nearly impossible to turn down a request from a senior officer and if the request is fulfilled resources will have to come from other projects. Having the CAC commander firmly in the chain of command would allow the center commanders someone to approach to speak on their behalf. Three star generals can be blunt with other three stars. Two star generals sometimes have to salute and move out smartly. The author had the privilege of witnessing this example first hand.

From the evidence provided in the previous chapters, the following recommendations are suggested. First, firmly establish clear lines of command and control. This will provide the Center of Excellence commanders top cover from being tasked from more than one organization and essentially having more than one boss to answer to. It would facilitate cooperation and integration because the CAC commander would have visibility on all actions. The Centers of Excellence in turn would have to be more responsive because all confusion of who works for who would be eliminated. It allows missions to be prioritized and resourced accordingly, so if the CAC commander disagrees with the AC commander, they can work the issue without getting the Center of Excellence commanders involved.

This recommendation is also organizationally sound because it ensures unity of command and fulfills Taylor's first scientific principle of how a traditional hierarchy is supposed to operate. Not following this first recommendation will leave TRADOC in the same situation that it is today. Centers of Excellence commanders will still have to answer to multiple bosses and deal

with any conflicts of guidance or requests for information. This leaves TRADOC open to criticism from outside of the organization that TRADOC is not working effectively as it could.

Second, establish a G-staff. There is no reason why TRADOC is unlike the rest of the military. Not having a G-staff makes others outside of the organization look at TRADOC with curiosity and question why it has not standardized its staff when all of the other staffs horizontally and vertically have already made the adjustment. It just makes plain sense. Having a G-staff would improve integration because organizations outside of TRADOC would know exactly who to contact. Figure 5 graphically summarizes the recommendations.




Fig. 5. Traditional Major Subordinate Command Construct with G-Staff.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Ibid., slide 36.

Of course, there will have to be some reorganization at TRADOC and CAC in order for these changes to be effective. Unfortunately, it is not as simple as just changing a sign or establishing a new procedure for everyone to follow. At CAC there will have to be an increase in staff. With all taskers and requests for information flowing through one headquarters, an increase in staff will be necessary to manage the workload and deconflict requirements. This increase in staff will result in definite payoffs down the road as Center of Excellence commanders will be able to apply their respective limited resources at hand toward legitimate issues instead of potentially wasting resources by trying to answer to multiple bosses which are sometimes asking for the same thing. Additionally, production may also increase as subordinate leaders will be able to plan projects instead of jumping from one short fused high priority tasker to another.

At the TRADOC level, the changes are not as complicated as one may think. For the functions executed by the current DCSPIL, the organization will have to be named G1/G4 in order to prevent an entirely new staff organization from being formed while at the same time indicating the functions that it performs. Remember that the current organization handles personnel issues, which are G1 functions as well as installation engineering, and facilities issues that are G4 functions. DCSOPS&T, later named G3/5/7 will remain focused on operations and training while moving all combat development functions to the Futures Center. The CIO and DCSRM will naturally transition to G6 and G8 respectively with no organizational changes whatsoever. With these changes in effect, those outside of TRADOC will be able to coordinate with confidence that they are calling on the organization that best meets their needs.

Hypothetical Course of Action

The following is a hypothetical course of action that could be undertaken if there is a serious consideration to increase the effectiveness of TRADOC. The entire process is similar to designing a campaign plan. The optimal endstate is identified, mission analysis is conducted, courses of action are developed, analyzed, and compared, and finally a decision is made.

First, taking the lessons learned from the Parker Panel, Reorganization of 1972, and Operation Steadfast, the TRADOC commander should hand pick a small group of talented senior military and civilian personnel without personal agendas to spearhead this effort. This group should operate in secrecy and therefore potentially prevent the process from being derailed by outside forces. Second, this group should develop a detailed plan taking into consideration what TRADOC does and how the processes are aligned within the organization. Their conclusions will naturally identify that there are eleven core functions assigned to TRADOCs' MSC and staff with the preponderance of the work being done at the center level. It will also be discovered that the processes do not follow traditional lines of command and control and that this defect causes frustration at the Center of Excellence level because of duplication of work, multiple taskings originating from various command and staff elements, and competition for resources to accomplish those taskings. This small group would also determine that a G-staff is needed to facilitate integration vertically and horizontally inside and outside of the Army.

Third, this group should then garner buy in from TRADOCs senior leaders in a common forum. Again, this should prevent the processes from becoming derailed by personal agendas. Senior leaders are much more apt to make the right decisions in front of superiors and peers alike. Disguising personal agendas is very difficult with this type of transparency. This will only work though if the TRADOC commander lays the ground rule that discussion of this topic can only take place in this open forum. Feathers may be ruffled, but personal agendas will be prevented from entering the process through backdoor channels.

Finally, with the decision made by the TRADOC senior leaders, the new reorganization plan can be unveiled to the rest of the command. Of course, there will be great concern and contempt that the new organization will not work and some may say there is a potential that TRADOC will not be able to function. In any type of reorganization, there will always be naysayers that are comfortable with status quo for one reason or another. Some may even say, as in reference to the G-staff, that it is good to be different from the rest of the military because it

forces individuals outside the organization to learn what TRADOC does. It is obvious to see the failure in that type of logic.

After the changes have been put into effect, TRADOC will be a better organization and its members will see the benefits. Yes, jobs may be reduced in the process, but the organization overall will be healthier as a whole. No longer those outside of TRADOC question why the lack of a G-staff and the commanders at the Centers of Excellence will know exactly who their boss is. Finally, with these changes in place, the goofiness in TRADOC will be mitigated and effectiveness will improve.

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